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The Partially Observable Games We Play for Cyber Deception
Mohamadreza Ahmadi, Murat Cubuktepe, Nils Jansen, Sebastian Junges
Joost-Pieter Katoen and Ufuk Topcu
Abstract—Progressively intricate cyber infiltration mecha-
nisms have made conventional means of defense, such as
firewalls and malware detectors, incompetent. These sophisti-
cated infiltration mechanisms can study the defender’s behavior,
identify security caveats, and modify their actions adaptively. To
tackle these security challenges, cyber-infrastructures require
active defense techniques that incorporate cyber deception, in
which the defender (deceiver) implements a strategy to mislead
the infiltrator. To this end, we use a two-player partially
observable stochastic game (POSG) framework, wherein the
deceiver has full observability over the states of the POSG,
and the infiltrator has partial observability. Then, the deception
problem is to compute a strategy for the deceiver that minimizes
the expected cost of deception against all strategies of the
infiltrator. We first show that the underlying problem is a
robust mixed-integer linear program, which is intractable to
solve in general. Towards a scalable approach, we compute
optimal finite-memory strategies for the infiltrator by a reduc-
tion to a series of synthesis problems for parametric Markov
decision processes. We use these infiltration strategies to find
robust strategies for the deceiver using mixed-integer linear
programming. We illustrate the performance of our technique
on a POSG model for network security. Our experiments
demonstrate that the proposed approach handles scenarios
considerably larger than those of the state-of-the-art methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
“If deception1 can be used for cyber-attacks, can it also
be used for defense?”. This question was raised by the
renowned hacker, Kevin Mitnick, in his famous book The
Art of Deception [25]. The reason for asking for such
advanced cyber-defense mechanisms is the ever-escalating
progress of cyber-infiltration [28]. Furthermore, the prolific
reliance of governments, industries, and individuals on cyber-
infrastructure, thanks to the growth of applications of AI and
machine learning tools, makes them particularly attractive for
cyber-terrorism and cyber-crime [16].
Deception is a familiar technique for war zone strate-
gists [7] and for cyber-infiltrators or hackers [8]. In cyber-
infiltration, for example, deception can be achieved by
changing malware signatures, social engineering, concealing
codes, and encrypting exploits. On the other hand, deception
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1Deceiving means to “deliberately cause (someone) to believe something
that is not true, especially for personal gain” according to the Oxford English
Dictionary.
defense strategies can use deceits and feints to thwart an
infiltrator’s cognitive processes, disrupt the breach process,
and delay infiltration activities. Such deception can be car-
ried out via misleading, obfuscations, and fake responses.
These methods rely on the infiltrator’s belief in the network
responses and data. For instance, honeypot servers (fake
servers that mimic actual servers) are commonly used to
actively detect malicious activity and reveal the infiltrator’s
strategies [27]. From a cyber-deception standpoint, two fac-
tors, namely, the amount of deception and the frequency of
deception, characterize the cost of implementing a deception
mechanism.
Cyber-deception can be mathematically formalized as a
non-cooperative two-player dynamic game [1], [24], [29],
which can represent the adversarial sequential decision mak-
ing nature of a deception/infiltration scenario and the limited
cyber-defense/infiltration resources. In particular, games with
imperfect information can represent the information asymme-
try, which is at the heart of cyber-deception, i.e., the deceiver
has full knowledge over the cyber-infrastructure, such as
servers, but the infiltrator does not. Recently, in [18], the
authors proposed a modeling framework for cyber-deception
in terms of a one-sided partially observable Markov decision
processes-a special class of partially observable Markov
decision processes (POSGs), where one player has full ob-
servability and the second one does not. Despite this unique
modeling paradigm, POSGs are notoriously intractable to
solve in general [15]. Three approximate methods have been
proposed in the literature for solving POSGs either by a
memory bounded representation of the value function [11],
by approximating it by a series of smaller, related Bayesian
games using heuristics [21], or by using heuristic search
value iteration [17].
For POSGs, the optimal strategies for the deceiver may
require infinite-memory, or they may require unbounded-
memory. To obtain a tractable formulation, we use finite-
memory strategies for the infiltrator. Using finite memory,
we have a compact representation of the infiltrator strategies.
Then, we search for strong finite-memory infiltrator strategies
that induces a low cost for the infiltrator. The set of all finite-
memory infiltrator strategies is uncountable, and the measure
of the finite-memory strategies that induces a low cost for
the infiltrator may be small compared to the set of all finite-
memory strategies. Therefore, methods such as evolutionary
algorithms or Bayesian methods may not be applicable in this
setting. We define the infiltrator strategy synthesis problem
as a synthesis problem in parametric MDPs [14], and we use
our previous work [6] to synthesize strategies in a parametric
Fig. 1. Multi-layer network topology.
MDP using convex-concave approach [23]. Finally, using the
infiltrator strategies, we compute a robust deceiver strategy
that maximizes the worst-case cost of the all strategies using
mixed-integer linear programming (MILP). We demonstrate
that, we can compute strategies for a deception game with
higher number of states and action than those that can be
tackled by the state-of-the-art methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we motivate the problem studied in this paper
with a motivating example. In Section III, we provide some
preliminary definitions and formulate the problem. In Section
IV, we describe our two-stage tractable approach. In Section
V, we apply the proposed approach to the motivating example.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI and give
directions for future research.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE:
ACTIVE DECEPTION FOR NETWORK SECURITY
We motivate the problem under study in this paper by
a computer network security example adapted from [18].
Consider a multilayer network used typically in critical
network operations such as power plants and manufactur-
ing facilities [20], [4] (see Figure 1). The infiltrator starts
the attack from outside of the network and proceeds by
accessing deeper layers, where more sensitive/valuable assets
are located. The middle layers are composed of databases
containing confidential data and the last layer provides access
to physical devices. Infiltration to the last layer of the
network can lead to critical damage to the facility [22].
The network we consider consists of n layers as illustrated
in Figure 2. Each column in Figure 2 corresponds to a
network layer, e.g., emails, databases, actuators and sensors,
and etc.
The deceiver’s task here is to manipulate the infiltrator’s
belief over whether he/she is being detected. The deceived
infiltrator is hence convinced to take wrong actions due to the
uncertainty about the infiltration progress. The deceiver has
to manipulate the infiltrator’s belief and keep him engaged
in the network.
One way to represent the network security problem de-
picted in Figure 2 is to represent it by a one-sided POSG (to
be described formally in the sequel), which is comprised of
two parts. The upper-half corresponds to the states, wherein
the presence of the infiltrator in the network has not been
detected (d = false) and the deception mechanism cannot
be implemented; whereas, the lower half corresponds to the
case wherein the infiltrator is detected and therefore we can
choose either actions “engage” or “block”.
The arrows illustrate the transitions in the game character-
ized by a transition function T . We assume all transitions are
deterministic, except transitions from d = false to d = true.
The infiltrator starts the attack at a computer outside the
network xA = 0. The infiltrator attempts to access computers
in deeper layers by compromiseing them. He/she also has
the option to wait at any layer, takedown, which reveals
the presence of the infiltrator and the infiltrator is forced to
exit the network and restart the attack. Another course of
action is to incur small amount of damage by exfiltrateing
of data, which does not attract the deceiver’s attention.
The infiltrator does not receive observations for detection
state d, but is aware of xA (the network Layer being infil-
trated). The deceiver has no information over the infiltrator
until the infiltrator has been detected.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first lay the formal foundations for
POSGs, followed by a formal problem statement together
with the underlying optimization problem.
A. Foundations
A probability distribution over a finite or countably infinite
set X is a function µ : X → [0, 1] ⊆ R with
∑
x∈X µ(x) =
µ(X) = 1. The set of all distributions on X is Distr(X).
The support of a distribution µ is supp(µ) = {x ∈
X |µ(x) > 0}. A distribution is Dirac if |supp(µ)| = 1.
Let V = {x1, . . . , xn} be a finite set of variables over the
real numbers R. The set of multivariate polynomials over V
is Q[V ]. An instantiation for V is a function u : V → R.
Definition 1 (SG) A stochastic game (SG) is a tuple G =
(S◦, S, sI,Act ,P) with a finite set S = S◦∪S of states, a
set S◦ of Player 1 states, a set S of Player 2 state, the initial
state sI ∈ S, a finite set Act of actions, and a transition
function P : S × Act → Distr(S). We define costs using a
state-action cost function C : S ×Act → R≥0.
A Markov decision process (MDP) is an SG in which
S◦ = ∅, and consequently S = S. A path of an SG G is
an (in)finite sequence pi = s0
a0−→ s1
a1−→ s, where s0 = sI,
si ∈ S, ai ∈ Act , and P(si, ai)(si+1) 6= 0 for all i ∈ N.
For finite pi, last(pi) denotes the last state of pi. The set of
(in)finite paths of G is PathsGfin (Paths
G).
Definition 2 (SG strategy) A strategy σ for G is a pair σ =
(σ1, σ2) of functions σi : {pi ∈ Paths
G
fin | last(pi) ∈ Si} →
Distr(Act) such that for all pi ∈ PathsGfin , {a | σi(pi)(a) >
0} ⊆ Act
(
last(pi)
)
.
A Player-i strategy σi (for i ∈ {1, 2}) is memoryless if
last(pi) = last(pi′) implies σi(pi) = σi(pi
′) for all pi, pi′ ∈
dom(σi). It is deterministic if σi(pi) is a Dirac distribution
for all pi ∈ dom(σi).
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Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the transition system of the one-sided POSG model for network security. The bold actions correspond to the deceiver;
whereas, the rest belong to the infiltrator.
Definition 3 (One-sided POSG) A one-sided partially ob-
servable stochastic game (POSG) is a tuple G = (G,Z,O),
with G = (S◦, S, sI,Act ,P) the underlying SG of G, Z
a finite set of observations, and O : S → Z the observation
function for Player 2.
A partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP)
is an one-sided POSG in which S◦ = ∅, and consequently
S = S. In a POSG, players cannot make any choice when
|Act(s)| = 1. Thus, for a POSG G with states S◦ ∪ S, the
POSG G′ with states S′◦ = S◦ \ {s ∈ S◦ | |Act(s)| = 1}
and S′

= S ∪ {s ∈ S◦ | |Act(s)| = 1} and all transitions
unchanged is equivalent w.r.t. the properties considered in
the paper. Consequently, a POSG where one player never
has a choice, i.e. |Act(s)| = 1, ∀s ∈ S◦ is also an MDP.
Without loss of generality, we assume Player 2 can observe
its own available actions, thus |Act(s)| = |Act(s′)| for all
s, s′ ∈ S with O(s) = O(s
′). Essentially, in a one-sided
POSG, Player 1 has full observability, while Player 2 has
only partial observability. We lift the observation function
to paths: For pi = s0
a0−→ s1
a1−→ ssn ∈ Paths
M
fin , the
associated observation sequence is O(pi) = O(s0)
a0−→
O(s1)
a1−→ sO(sn).
Definition 4 (POSG Strategy) An observation-based strat-
egy σ = (σ1, σ2) for a one-sided POSG G is a strategy
(σ1, σ2) for the underlying SG G such that σ2(pi) = σ2(pi
′)
for all pi, pi′ ∈ PathsGfin with O(pi) = O(pi
′). σ1 is the
Player 1 strategy, and σ2 is the (observation-based) Player 2
strategy.
Applying the strategy σ = (σ1, σ2) to a POSG G resolves
all nondeterminism and partial observability, resulting in
the induced Markov chain Gσ . In general, POSGs extend
POMDPs and optimal strategies require infinite memory in
general [5]. To represent observation-based strategies with
finite memory, we use finite-state controllers (FSCs). If such
an FSC has n memory states, we speak of memory size n
for the underlying strategy σ.
Definition 5 (FSC) A finite-state controller (FSC) for a
POMDP M is a tuple A = (N,nI, γ, δ), where N is a
finite set of memory nodes, nI ∈ N is the initial memory
node, γ is the action mapping γ : N×Z → Distr(Act), and
δ is the memory update δ : N × Z ×Act → Distr(N). The
set FSCMk denotes the set of FSCs with k memory nodes,
called k-FSCs.
From a node n and the observation z in the current state
of the POMDP, the next action a is chosen from Act(z)
randomly as given by γ(n, z). Then, the successor node of
the FSC is determined randomly via δ(n, z, a).
Specifications. For a POSG G and a set T ⊆ S of target
states, we consider the maximal (or minimal) probability
PrGmax(♦T ) (Pr
G
min(♦T )) to reach T , as well as the maximal
(or minimal) expected cost ECGmax(♦T ) (EC
G
min(♦T )). For
a probability bound λ ∈ [0, 1] and an expected cost bound
κ ∈ R, we also consider specifications of the form ϕ =
P≤λ(♦T ) and ψ = EC≤κ(♦T ), where the probability or the
expected cost to reach T shall be at most λ or κ, respectively.
The specification ϕ is satisfied for a strategy σ = (σ1, σ2)
and the POSG G if the probability PrG
σ
(♦T ) of reaching a
target state in Gσ is at most λ, denoted by Mσ |= ϕ. This
satisfaction relation is analogous for expected cost.
Sufficiently strong strategies. For a POSG G and a property
ϕ, a strategy σ1 for Player 1 is called sufficiently strong for
ϕ against a set S ⊆ Σ2 of strategies for Player 2, if for each
strategy σ2 ∈ S of Player 2, G(σ1,σ2) |= ϕ.
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Fig. 3. The Robust Deception Problem.
B. Deception Games
Definition 6 (Deception Game) A deception game is a one-
sided POSG, where Player 1 (with full observability) is
called the infiltrator and Player 2 (with partial observability)
is called the deceiver. See Figure 3 for an illustration of the
robust deception problem.
In the POSG that captures the motivating example, we
identify the target states T ⊆ S as the states that correspond
to Layer n. The goal is to deceive the infiltrator such that the
expected cost to reach those states is maximized. We state
the formal problem.
Problem 1: Given a deception game G = (G,Z,O),
a set of target states T ⊆ S, memory bound n, and
specification ϕ = ECGmin(♦T ), compute a sufficiently
strong strategy for the deceiver, against infiltration-
strategies with memory n′ ≤ n.
The straightforward solution to Problem 1 can be given by
solving a robust mixed-integer linear program (MILP) with
variables as described next.
For s◦ ∈ S◦ and each action a ∈ Act , the strategy variable
δs◦a ∈ {0, 1} denotes which action is active in each state s◦.
If δs◦a = 1, then Player 1 takes action a in state s◦. For
s◦ ∈ S◦, and s ∈ S, the cost variables cs◦ ≥ 0 cs ≥ 0
and represent the expected cost of reaching T ⊆ S. M is
a large constant that automatically satisfies the constraints
in (6) and (7) if δs◦a = 0, which means the deceiver does not
select action a in state s◦. γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor
to ensure that we have finite expected cost.
We then have the following robust MILP that solves Prob-
lem 1.
minimize
cs◦ ,cs
,δ
s◦
a
csI (1)
subject to
cs = 0, ∀s ∈ T (2)∑
a∈Act
σza = 1, ∀z ∈ Z (3)
∑
a∈Act
δs◦a = 1, ∀s◦ ∈ S◦ (4)
cs = C(s, a) +
∑
a∈Act
σO(s)a
∑
s′
◦
∈§◦
P(s, a, s
′
◦) cs′◦ ,
∀s ∈ S \ T, ∀σ
O(s)
a ∈ σ2 (5)
cs◦ ≥ C(s◦, a) + γ
∑
s′

∈S
P(s◦, a, s
′

) cs′

−M (1− δs◦a ),
∀s◦ ∈ S◦ \ T, ∀a ∈ Act (6)
cs◦ ≤ C(s◦, a) + γ
∑
s′

∈S
P(s◦, a, s
′

) cs′

+M (1− δs◦a ),
∀s◦ ∈ S◦ \ T, ∀a ∈ Act . (7)
The objective in (1) minimizes the expected cost of the
deceiver. We assign the expected cost of the states in the
target set to 0 by the constraints in (2). We ensure that the
strategies of the infiltrator and the deceiver are well-defined
with the constraints in (3) and (4). The constraints in (5)–(7)
gives the computation for the expected cost in the states of
the POSG.
Proposition 1 The robust MILP in (1) – (7) computes the
maximal probability of reaching T under a (maximizing)
randomized memoryless observation-based strategy.
Unfortunately, robust MILP’s are notoriously hard to
solve, except in special cases of small problems with few
constraints [12] or only having binary variables [3]. Re-
cently, [26] proposes a heuristic relaxation for robust MILP’s
using the affinely adjustable robust counterpart [2]. However,
large robust MILP’s, such as the robust MILP above for
Problem 1, remain intractable in general.
IV. TRACTABLE APPROACH
In this section, we propose a two-stage approach for
solving Problem 1. We begin by giving some key formalisms.
1) Parametric MDPs: Instead of having fixed probabilities
in the transition function of an MDP, we allow to describe
the transition probabilities of an MDP as polynomials over
a fixed set of variables. By having different values for the
parameters, we can induce different MDPs.
Definition 7 (pMDP) A parametric Markov decision pro-
cess (pMDP) M is a tuple M = (S, sI,Act , V,P) with a
finite (or countably infinite) set S of states, initial state sI ∈
S, a finite set Act of actions, a finite set V of parameters,
and a transition function P : S ×Act × S → Q[V ].
Deception Game
One-sided POSG
Symbolic Representation
of Infiltration Strategies
Parametric Markov
Decision Process
Set of Infiltration
Strategies
Strategies satisfying the
Infiltration Objectives
Memory
Finite State Controller
Fig. 4. Computing Infiltration Strategies for Stage 1.
Applying an instantiation u : V → R to a pMDP M ,
denotedM [u], replaces each polynomialQ[V ] inM by Q[u].
M [u] is also called the instantiation ofM at u. Instantiation
u is well-defined for M if the replacement yields probability
distributions, i. e., if M [u] is an MDP.
Definition 8 (pMDP Synthesis Problem) Given a pMDP
M and a property ϕ, the synthesis problem is to compute an
instantiation u such that M [u] |= ϕ, if one exists.
The pMDP synthesis problem amounts to solving the
following NLP.
maximize
cs,V
csI (8)
subject to
csI ≤ κ, (9)
cs = 0, ∀s ∈ T (10)
P(s, a, s′) ≥ 0, ∀s, s′ ∈ S, ∀a ∈ Act (11)∑
s′∈S
P(s, a, s′) = 1, ∀s ∈ S, ∀a ∈ Act (12)
cs ≥ C(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P(s, a, s′) cs′ , (13)
∀s ∈ S \ T, ∀a ∈ Act .
For s ∈ S, the cost variable cs ≥ 0 represents an upper
bound of expected cost of reaching target set T ⊆ S, and
the parameters in set V enter the NLP as part of the functions
from Q[V ] in the transition function P .
One particular efficient method for finding parameter
instantiations is given in [6], which solves the NLP in (8)–
(13) via a reformulation to a convex-concave programming
problem [23] and an efficient integration of model checking
calls to improve its performance. We are now ready to outline
the proposed tractable approach.
A. Stage 1: Computing Infiltration Strategies
In this section, we are given a POSG and are interested
in computing several sufficiently strong infiltrator strategies.
For an overview of the approach in Stage 1, see Figure 4.
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Fig. 5. From POSG to pMDP
Task 1 Given a POSG G, compute several sufficiently
strong strategies for the infiltrator.
We detail the approach first for an infiltrator that uses
memoryless strategies. We then generalize the approach to
any (finite but fixed) amount of memory for the infiltrator.
The approach extends the reduction from POMDPs to pMCs
in [19].
1) Memoryless strategies: A memoryless strategy maps
observations to distributions over actions. Equivalently,
such strategy maps observation-action pairs to probabilities
(ObAct-probabilities). Any memoryless strategy is uniquely
defined by its ObAct-probabilities. Instead of finding suit-
able strategies for the infiltrator, we can thus reformulate
our approach to finding suitable ObAct-probabilities. Hence,
a suitable strategy can be described as parameter values
that satisfy the property of an pMDP. To find the ObAct-
probabilities, we construct an equivalent pMDP as illustrated
in the following example.
Example 1 Consider the POSG in Fig. 5(a). The states
for Player 1 are given by circles. Similarly, the rectangles
depict the states for Player 2. We indicate the actions from
the states with solid lines to black dots. The corresponding
probabilities from the black dots give the probability of
transitioning to the next state. Thus, we draw dashed (direct)
lines from the Player 1 (Player 2) nodes. The colors of states
indicate the corresponding observations.
The corresponding pMDP for a memoryless, observation-
based strategy for player 2 is given in Fig. 5(b). The actions
of player 1 are unchanged. As there is no more nondeter-
minism in the states of player 2, we can also view these
states as player 1 states. Moreover, to avoid clutter, we omit
action indications. Consider state s3 with outgoing action a2,
which leads with probability 1 to s4. Under a strategy, we
take this action with probability q: Thus, in the pMDP there
is an arc with probability q from s3 to s4. If we take action
a2 with probability q, we take action a1 with probability
1−q. The same probabilities for taking the actions have
to hold in state s1. Observe that the probabilities are not
immediately reflected, as there are two paths from s1 to
s2. The parameters in s0 are different. Indeed, there are 2
parameters as there are three actions to take.
We formalize the construction below for situations, where the
infiltrator has three available actions in each state, to simplify
the notation.
Definition 9 Given a POSG G = (G,Z,O) with SG G =
(S◦, S, sI,Act ,P). Let ∀s ∈ S |Act(s)| = 3. Without
loss of generality, refer to Act(s) = {a1, a2, a3} if s ∈ S.
The pMDP M ′ = (S′, sI
′,Act ′, V,P ′) is the corresponding
pMDP for POSG G, if S′ = S◦ ∪ S, s
′
I = sI, Act
′ =
Act ∪ {⊥}, V = {pz1, p
z
2 | z ∈ Z} and P
′(s, a, s′) =


P(s, a, s′) if s ∈ S◦∑3
i=1 f
z
i P(s, ai, s
′) if s ∈ S, a = ⊥, z = O(s)
0 otherwise.
where fzi denotes p
z
1, p
z
2 and 1− p
z
1 − p
z
2, respectively.
The construction is straightforward to adapt to a varying
number of actions per state: Indeed, we just need additional
variables pzi indicating that we take action i in a state with
observation z.
We denote the memoryless strategy IStrat(u) for the infil-
trator in the deception game that is induced by a valuation
u in the infiltration-pMDP.
Theorem 1 Given a deception game G, with its correspond-
ing infiltration-pMDP I(G), and a property ϕ. Let u be a
solution for the pMDP synthesis problem for the property
ϕ. Then IStrat(u) is a sufficiently strong strategy for the
infiltrator on the G and ϕ.
2) Adding Memory to the Infiltrator Strategy: The ideas
for the synthesis of memoryless strategies can be lifted to a
finite (k) memory setting. We apply an k−unfolding of the
POSG, and then search for a memoryless infiltrator strategy.
The idea is to create k copies of the POSG, and allow
the infiltrator to freely switch between copies. The different
copies correspond to the internal memory of the infiltrator.
B. Stage 2: Computing a Robust Deception Strategy
In this section, we assume that the deceiver obtained N
strategies for the infiltrator. Then, the task of the deceiver is
to compute a strategy that minimizes the worst-case expected
cost ψ = EC≤κ(♦T ) to reach a target set T against any
of the N infiltration strategies under all deceiver policies.
If the deception strategy has access to the memory node
of the infiltration strategy, we call the infiltration memory
transparent.
Task 2 Given a deception game, a set of transparent in-
filtration strategies, compute a deception strategy that is
optimal under all deception strategies against the set of
infiltration strategies.
1) Deceiving against Transparent-Memory Infiltrator
Strategies: We focus on memoryless infiltration strategies.
Memoryless infiltration strategies are the most prominent
transparent memory case, and for transparent memory, each
finite memory strategy can be reduced to a memoryless
strategy by unfolding the memory into the MDP, as in
Stage 1.
To compute a robust deception strategy against transparent
infiltrator strategies, we remove the uncertain constraints of
the robust MILP in (1) – (7) by using the infiltrator strategies
that we obtained in Stage 1. Then, we reduce the problem of
synthesizing a robust deception strategy problem to solving
an MILP instead of solving a robust MILP. We now give the
details of the resulting MILP with the infiltrator strategies.
We define the following variables for the following MILP:
For s◦ ∈ S◦, s ∈ S, and for each infiltrator strategy
σi,O(s), i = 1, . . . , N , the cost variables cis◦ ≥ 0 and
cis ≥ 0 give the expected cost of reaching T ⊆ S for each
infiltrator strategies. For s◦ ∈ S◦ and each action a ∈ Act ,
the strategy variable δs◦a ∈ {0, 1} denotes which action is
active in each state s◦. If δ
s◦
a = 1, then the deceiver takes
action a in state s◦.
For observation z ∈ Z , for each action a ∈ Act and
for each infiltrator strategy σi,O(s), i = 1, . . . , N , σ
i,O(s)
a
represents the probability of choosing action a ∈ Act upon
observation z for each strategy of Player 2. Similar to the
Problem 1, M is a large constant that automatically satisfies
the constraints in (18) and (19) if δs◦a = 0, which means the
deceiver does not select action a in state s◦.
We thus have the following MILP:
minimize
ci
s◦
,ci
s

,δ
s◦
a
max
i
risI (14)
subject to
cis = 0, ∀s ∈ T, i = 1, . . . , N (15)∑
a∈Act
δs◦a = 1, ∀s◦ ∈ S◦ (16)
cis = C(s, a) +
∑
a∈Act
σi,O(s)a
∑
s′
◦
∈§◦
P(s, a, s
′
◦) c
i
s′
◦
,
∀s ∈ S \ T, i = 1, . . . , N (17)
cis◦ ≥ C(s◦, a) + γ
∑
s′

∈S
P(s◦, a, s
′

) cis′

−M(1− δs◦a ),
∀s◦ ∈ S◦ \ T, ∀a ∈ Act , i = 1, . . . , N
(18)
cis◦ ≤ C(s◦, a) + γ
∑
s′

∈S
P(s◦, a, s
′

) cis′

+M(1− δs◦a ),
∀s◦ ∈ S◦ \ T, ∀a ∈ Act , i = 1, . . . , N.
(19)
The objective in (14) minimize the worst-case expected
cost of deception against the infiltrator strategies. The con-
straint in (15) sets the expected cost of the states in T to be
0. Constraint (16) ensures that the deceiver picks one of the
actions in Act for each state in S◦. The constraints (17)–(19)
concerns the cost computation for each state in S◦, and S.
By solving the MILP in (14) – (19), we construct a strategy
for the deceiver that is sufficiently strong against infiltrator
strategies. By construction, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 The MILP in (14) – (19) computes a sufficiently
strong strategy for the deceiver against N strategies of the
infiltrator.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
At this point, we are ready to return to the motivating
example. We define the expected discounted cost for the
deceiver corresponding to each action the infiltrator takes
by
L =
∞∑
t=1
γt−1 · l(t),
where γ is the discount factor and l(t) denotes the loss at
stage t. For this example, the specification of the deceiver is
ψ = ECmin, which is to minimize L against all infiltration
strategies. Table IV-B.1 outlines the elements of the one-
sided deception POSG. Note that since the players take
actions concurrently, the costs depend on their joint actions.
Furthermore, some of the costs are dependent on the layer
index i the infiltrator has accessed. For more details about
the example, the interested reader is referred to [18].
We first describe our results on a 4-layer network, given
by [18]. Then, we demonstrate our approach on a 12-layer
network. For each network, we first compute infiltration
strategies for the deceiver using the approach in Stage 1.
Then, using these infiltration strategies, we compute a robust
deceiver strategy, which is given by in Stage 2. The arising
pMDP problems from Stage 1 is solved using the approach
in [6]. We solve the MILP problems from Stage 2 using the
MILP solver GUROBI [13].
For the 4-layer network, we first construct the one-sided
deception POSG with 2 memory nodes. The POSG con-
sists of 49 states, 8 action choices for the deceiver, and
34 actions for the infiltrator. After computing an optimal
deceiver strategy, the worst-case induced cost against 1000
infiltration strategies obtained from the approach in Stage 1
is 282.22. The obtained cost is comparable to the approach
given by [18]. The procedure for obtaining the infiltration
strategies took 193.29 seconds, and time to compute the
optimal deceiver strategy is 216.92 seconds.
The optimal deceiver strategy that we obtained is to engage
the infiltrator in first 2 layers, then blocking the infiltrator
in the last layers. This seems to be beneficial compared to
always blocking the infiltrator, which leads to a worst-case
expected cost of 341.72, and always engaging the infiltrator,
which leads to a worst-case expected cost of 304.05.
We also give the results with different number of infiltrator
strategies on a 4-layer and 12-layer network in Table V. The
expected cost of the defender increases with increasing num-
ber of infiltrator strategies in all cases. Also, by increasing
number of layers, the deceiver can craft an optimal strategy in
a 12-layer network that incurs a less expected loss compared
to the optimal strategy in a 4-layer network. However, if
the deceiver always blocks or engages, the expected cost
increases with increasing number of layers.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented an approach to solve a partially observable
stochastic game (POSG), where one of the player has full
observability over the states, and the other player only
has partial observability. We formulated the problem as a
robust mixed-integer linear program, which is intractable
to solve in general. To obtain a more scalable approach,
we computed a robust optimal strategy for the deceiver by
synthesizing a set of infiltration strategies using parameter
synthesis in parametric Markov decision processes. Using a
mixed-integer linear program and the infiltration strategies,
we computed the robust deception strategy. We illustrated
our approach on a POSG model for network security and
we showed that we can handle larger networks compared to
the previous approaches in the literature.
Future work concerns removing the transparency approach,
which means the deceiver has access to the memory node
of the infiltration strategy, if the infiltration strategy is
memory-based. Also, we will explore some of the recent
methods to solve mixed-integer linear problems proposed in
the literature, such as methods proposed in [9], [10].
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